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The Honorable William H. Stafford, Jr., Senior District Judge of the Northern District of*
Florida, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  07-1635
WINDAL COX; TAMIKA MCAFEE,
               Appellants
           v.
RONALD PATE; CITY OF BUTLER
                                                        
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 05-CV-1712
Magistrate Judge: The Honorable Francis X. Caiazza
                                                        
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 20, 2008
Before: SMITH and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, 
and STAFFORD, District Judge*
(Filed:  June 16, 2008)
                                                        
OPINION
                                                        
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
In December of 2003, Sergeant Pate, an officer with the Drug Task Force of the 
2Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, obtained from a Pennsylvania
district justice a search warrant for a hotel room at the Days Inn in Butler, Pennsylvania. 
During the execution of the search warrant, Windal Cox and Tamika McAfee, the
occupants of the hotel room, were detained.  When the search uncovered crack-cocaine,
cell phones, and a firearm, both Cox and McAfee were arrested.  Although McAfee was
released on the same day of her arrest, Cox remained in custody for almost a year.  In
April of 2004, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against Cox and McAfee,
charging both of them with violating provisions of the Controlled Substances Act.  Cox
was also charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1).  
Cox and McAfee moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of
their hotel room.  The District Court granted the motion, finding that the probable cause
affidavit was made with at least a reckless disregard for the truth concerning the
confidential informant’s reliability, and that with excision of these misrepresentations,
probable cause was lacking.  Following the dismissal of the indictment, Cox and McAfee
filed this civil rights action against Sergeant Pate and the City of Butler, alleging several
state law claims and a § 1983 claim that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated as
a result of the search of their hotel room and their subsequent arrest.  The parties
consented pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) to the Magistrate Judge’s conducting the
proceedings.  Thereafter, Sergeant Pate and the City of Butler filed a motion for summary
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. 1
Appellate jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because Cox and McAfee only challenge
the Magistrate Judge’s grant of summary judgment on their Fourth Amendment claims against
Sergeant Pate, we need not review the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Butler
or on their state law claims.  Our review of an order granting summary judgment is subject to
plenary review.  Shuman ex rel Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir.
2005).
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judgment.  The Magistrate Judge granted the motion, concluding that Cox’s and
McAfee’s unlawful search claims were barred because they failed to demonstrate that
they sustained any damages.  The false arrest claims also fell because Cox conceded that
there was probable cause for his arrest, and because the Magistrate Judge concluded that
there was probable cause for McAfee’s arrest.
This timely appeal followed.   Cox and McAfee assert that the Magistrate Judge1
erred because even if they are unable to establish that they sustained any damages, they
are entitled to nominal damages.  Sergeant Pate does not disagree that the Magistrate
Judge’s reasoning is flawed.  He submits, however, that we should affirm the grant of
summary judgment because there was probable cause to support the issuance of the
search warrant and the subsequent arrest.  
We agree with Cox and McAfee that the Magistrate Judge erred in his conclusion
that they sought only damages stemming from post-indictment proceedings.  Nonetheless,
we conclude that the grant of summary judgment in Sergeant Pate’s favor should not be
disturbed.  
The issue before us is not whether the suppression court properly applied the
4exclusionary rule in the criminal proceeding in deciding that the affidavit lacked probable
cause.  Rather, the issue in this civil rights action is whether Cox and McAfee can
establish that their constitutional right not to be subjected to a search without probable
cause was violated.  In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the “totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed
probable cause determinations.”  To put the question another way, were there sufficient
facts to establish that there was a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.”  Id.   After considering the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that the officers had probable cause to search.  We cannot
ignore that the confidential informant, who was not anonymous, met Sergeant Pate to
surrender the substance that the informant had recently purchased from Cox in his hotel
room, and that the substance field tested positive for crack-cocaine.  This, together with 
information from the confidential informant that she had observed a large amount of
currency and a large amount of crack-cocaine in the hotel room, provided a substantial
basis to conclude that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the hotel
room.  Id. at 239; see United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2006) (listing
specific aspects of tips that indicate reliability, including whether tip was conveyed in a
face-to-face interaction with an officer and whether informant may face consequences for
the information provided).  Because “probable cause justifies a search,” we will affirm
the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on the § 1983 Fourth Amendment
5claims.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996). 
Both Cox and McAfee also alleged in their complaint that they were arrested
without probable cause in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.  Sergeant Pate’s
summary judgment motion explicitly argued that probable cause existed for both the
search and the arrest and that the § 1983 false arrest claims failed as a matter of law. 
App. Vol. II at 45.  In response, Cox conceded that there was probable cause to arrest
him.  McAfee, however, refused to concede this point in the District Court, and addressed
only Sergeant Pate’s erroneous assertion that the subsequent indictment established that
there was probable cause for her arrest.  The Magistrate Judge appropriately recognized
that the subsequent indictment had no bearing on her claim for false arrest.  App. Vol. I,
at 7.  After considering the circumstances surrounding the arrest, including the contraband
seized during the execution of the search warrant, the Magistrate Judge concluded that
there was probable cause to arrest McAfee, App. Vol. I, at 9, and granted summary
judgment on McAfee’s false arrest claim in Sergeant Pate’s favor.   
On appeal, McAfee acknowledges that Sergeant Pate “advocated [in his motion for
summary judgment] that probable cause is a complete and affirmative defense” to her
false arrest claim.  She does not contend that Sergeant Pate lacked probable cause to
arrest her.  Instead, she asserts that, because the Magistrate Judge granted summary
judgment for reasons other than those advanced by Pate, she was deprived of the
opportunity to make a record in the district court that would allow her to adequately
6respond to Pate’s assertion that probable cause existed for her arrest.  In addition, she
summarily states that the Magistrate Judge erred because it failed to provide any
reasoning or case law to support its conclusion that probable cause existed.  
We cannot ignore the fact that probable cause to arrest Cox and McAfee has been
at issue since the commencement of this § 1983 action alleging a violation of  their Fourth
Amendment right not be arrested without probable cause.  Pate specifically argued in his
summary judgment motion that there was probable cause for the arrest.  For that reason,
we reject McAfee’s contention that she was deprived of the opportunity to make a record
on this pivotal issue. 
Nor are we persuaded that the Magistrate Judge erred in his probable cause
determination.  Based on the contraband recovered during the execution of the search
warrant, we agree with the District Court that there was probable cause to arrest McAfee,
who was one of the occupants of the hotel room.  See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366
(2003) (concluding that a reasonable inference could be drawn from the fact that each of
the three occupants had knowledge of and exercised dominion and control over the
contraband, thereby providing probable cause to arrest them).  Although McAfee suggests
that the Magistrate Judge erred because he failed to consider the preclusive effect that
should be accorded the suppression court’s conclusion in the criminal proceeding that the
exclusionary rule required suppression of the evidence seized during the search, we
conclude that McAfee does not have standing to invoke the exclusionary rule in this civil
7proceeding.  United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (instructing that
“standing to invoke the exclusionary rule has been confined to situations where the
Government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the victim of the unlawful
search”); see also Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 2001).
For the above reasons, we will affirm the Magistrate Judge’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Sergeant Pate.
